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(Mis )Conceptions: 
Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women's 
Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use 
of Known Donors 
Justyn Lezin· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A. A TALE OF Two WOMEN AND THEIR KNOWN SPERM DONOR 
Joanna and Kathy, a fictional couple, had been together ten years. 
Following their commitment ceremony six years ago, they began the 
process of preparing to have children. Each had always wanted to bear 
children, so they started to think about how Kathy would conceive, with the 
understanding that Joanna would do so a few years later. Kathy and Joanna 
wished that their children would be biologically related to one another 
through their biological father. They were uncomfortable about using a 
sperm bank, where neither they nor their children would know their sperm 
donor. I They wanted to feel certain that they could carefully choose a 
sperm donor who, in addition to having gone through thorough medical and 
genetic screening, also reasonably met their personal ideals. They sought 
someone who would be comfortable forfeiting his parental rights, but who 
would nonetheless play some small role in the lives of their children, 
allowing the children to know their biological father, albeit not as a parent. 
They were looking for someone they knew and could trust. When a good 
• J.D. Candidate, May 2003, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B., 
Smith College, 1993. I am grateful to Professor Lois Weithorn, whose substantive and 
supportive guidance was generously given and happily received. Many thanks to Alexis 
Lezin, Tamara Gould, and Laurie Schmidt whose moral support goes a very long way. I 
would also like to thank my partner, Kim Haveson, for her unending love, patience, critical 
thinking, and inspiration. 
1. Some sperm banks now allow the release of anonymous donor names when resulting 
children attain certain ages. Two banks that have adopted that approach include Pacific 
Reproductive Services in San Francisco, California, and Rainbow Flag Health Services in 
Alameda, California. See Pacific Reproductive Services, at http://www.hellobaby.coml 
(1997). 
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friend offered to play this role, they began a careful process of sorting 
through every issue they could think of with him. After two years of 
elaborate discussion, they all felt ready to make a commitment. Joanna and 
Kathy had a contract drawn up to make their plans to inseminate with their 
friend concrete and to establish that they, and any children they were to 
have, would have ongoing, occasional contact with the friend, but that he 
would not retain paternity rights or responsibilities. 
Originally, Kathy and Joanna wanted to perform inseminations at 
home. After consulting with their attorney, Joanna and Kathy learned that 
their state, California, having adopted a previous version of the Uniform 
Parentage Act,2 allowed that if the prospective donor first provided his 
sperm to a licensed physician who would then in turn hand it off to the 
couple; the donor would not be treated in law as the child's natural father,3 
allowing both the biological and the non-biological mother to become the 
2. The history and impact of the Unifonn Parentage Act (UPA) is worthy of its own 
discussion. Drafted by the Unifonn Law Commissioners, the UPA is intended as a model 
rule for states to adopt, with the goal of holding parents, not the state, responsible for their 
offspring. However, in recent years the UPA has been subject to considerable debate and 
substantial revision, particularly regarding assisted reproduction. The fonner UP A (1973) 
had a provision that a spenn donor for a married woman was not to be treated in law as the 
father of any resulting offspring, but only if the spenn was first provided to a physician. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407 (1973). California adopted that provision with 
modifications by eliminating the requirement that the woman be married. CAL. F AM. CODE 
§ 7613 (West 2001). 
The UPA was revised in 2000, and then revised again in 2002. In 2000, the Unifonn 
Law Commissioners changed the UPA's section 702 to state simply, "A donor is not a 
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 
702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (2000). This eliminated the requirement that a physician intennediary 
be used to effectively bar future assertions of the donor's legal parentage. On the other 
hand, section 702 isolated an unmarried biological mother as the only parent where donor 
spenn was used. See id. § 702 cmt. This seemed to preclude by omission the possibility of 
an unmarried partner establishing parentage based on herthis intentions to co-parent the 
child. Some argued that the effect for same-sex couples worked contrary to the UPA's 
goals, which are, wherever possible, to identify two responsible adults for each child where 
those adults intended to be the child's parents. 
In the 2002 UPA, section 702 remains unchanged. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 
9B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 2002). However, the revised version is worth noting, in part for its 
changed stance regarding intent to parent as detenninative oflegal parentage, especially as it 
relates to unmarried, heterosexual partners or co-parents. Per the 2002 UP A, a man can 
establish legal parentage to a child conceived through assisted reproduction with a woman 
not his wife, not only by providing spenn and announcing his intent to parent, but by 
entering into a parenting agreement with that woman before conception. UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT § 703-704, 9B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 2002). Although the UPA continues to be silent 
regarding same-sex couples in this context, the concept of establishing legal parentage based 
on preconception intent between unmarried, heterosexual partners who use assisted 
reproduction may be easily widened in the future to include same-sex couples. 
3. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § S(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973). "The donor of semen provided 
to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the 
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby 
conceived." !d. 
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child's legal parents.4 Joanna and Kathy called every doctor in their town, 
but none agreed to perform this service of "handing off' the sperm. Some 
doctors conveyed that they were uncomfortable with the alternative nature 
of Kathy and Joanna's family. Most were unwilling to deal with fresh 
semen,5 which, due to the difficulties of HIV testing, could not be 
guaranteed to be HIV -free. Other physicians would only receive the sperm 
if they then inseminated Kathy in their offices, protesting that the hand-off 
service was not sufficiently medical to merit their attention. It would be 
entirely different, they all said, if Kathy were married to her donor. She 
wouldn't require the hand off, and she would be free to use fresh sperm in 
any procedure they could provide. 
The couple and their donor decided to use the donor's frozen sperm. 
For months prior to insemination, their donor had stored up frozen sperm 
samples. The donor signed over the samples to Joanna and Kathy per their 
contract. After eight months of inseminations for Kathy, the couple and 
their sperm donor grew anxious. After both Kathy and the sperm donor 
submitted to rigorous fertility testing, it became clear that their donor had 
significant fertility impediments - his sperm count was dismally low. Not 
enough sperm could survive the freezing process. 
Although their fertility specialist told them that there were numerous 
effective treatments for compensating for low sperm count, these processes 
weren't available to Kathy and the sperm donor. In order to make the 
inseminations viable, they needed to use fresh semen so that the viable 
sperm could be culled using a laboratory procedure.6 According to their 
physician at the fertility practice,· the law simply didn't allow for the 
"medical" use of fresh sperm between unmarried people. Although he 
didn't know how or where to find the statute, the physician said that the 
law required that donors not married to their recipients were required to use 
frozen samples at least three months old to allow sufficient time for follow-
up testing. Kathy and Joanna, after years of planning and trying with their 
4. As state-registered domestic partners, each woman could then anticipate adopting her 
partner's biological children through a relatively streamlined process of stepparent adoption. 
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2002). 
5. For clarity, semen, also known as seminal fluid or ejaculate, is the fluid through 
which individual sperm cells are conducted out of the penis. Sperm and semen appear to be 
used interchangeably as they most often coexist, but are, on occasion, separated, as in 
intrauterine insemination (lUI) procedures, described infra at note 6. 
6. As discussed infra, there are now a broad range of assisted reproductive technologies. 
In the instant case, the intrauterine insemination procedures (lUI) proposed to the couple 
involve a process of spinning semen in a centrifuge to remove healthy sperm from the fresh 
semen so that it can be inserted directly into the recipient's uterus. Another increasingly 
common method of preparing sperm for lUI is using a "swim-up" method, whereby semen 
is placed in a viscous solution in a test tube. The test tube is incubated for approximately an 
hour, and viable sperm literally swim through the solution to be extracted, semen-free, from 
the top of the test tube and inserted into the uterus. As compared to the elaborate and 
expensive procedures associated with in vitro fertilization, the lUI process is simple and 
comparatively non-invasive. 
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donor, were devastated. They wanted to conceive their baby with the 
person they had consciously, carefully selected, and were willing and able 
to contract for relatively "low-tech" fertility services using fresh sperm, but 
those services weren't available to them because Kathy was not married to 
her sperm donor. 
B. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND THE LEGALLY UNMARRIED 
Assisted reproduction has grown vastly both in concept and practice in 
the last twenty years.7 What were previously barriers to conceptionS can 
now be sidestepped thanks to processes ranging from non-medical and 
"low-tech," to medical and complex.9 Through a combination of social, 
cultural, and legal factors, ever-increasing numbers of lesbians and/or 
single women, in addition to scores of heterosexually partnered women, are 
choosing to seek pregnancy through assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART). 10 Unlike many heterosexually partnered couples who anticipate 
being mutually biologically related to their offspring, lesbians and/or single 
women, subsequent to their choice whether to have primary partners, must 
make secondary decisions regarding their future children. While many 
women choose to use sperm from anonymous donors, 1 I many elect to 
inseminate with known donors men with whom they are not otherwise 
sexually or romantically intimate. '2 But as deliberate as many of these 
7. Lucy R. Dollens, Note, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the Difficulty in 
Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213,213-14 (2001). 
8. Issues that previously compromised ferti.lity, e.g., low sperm count, irregular cycle, 
and even a failure to produce viable ova, are all often overcome through the use of assisted 
reproductive technology. Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: 
Information, Communication and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. I, I (1991-92); see also GENA 
COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL 
INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 6 (1985); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: 
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES I (1994). 
9. Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 
Hous. L. REv. 609,614 (1997). 
10. See ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 1 (estimating that 20,000-30,000 babies are 
conceived each year in the United States using artificial insemination); Carmen B. Sella, 
When a Mother is a Legal Stranger to Her Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian 
Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 140 (1991) (estimating that 5,000-
10,000 lesbians have conceived through artificial insemination); Dollens supra note 7, at 
214. 
11. See KIM TOEVS & STEPHANIE BRILL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN CONCEPTION, 
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 129-45 (2002). Historically, all donor insemination was 
anonymous, as physicians encouraged married couples using donor insemination to pretend 
that their children were biologically related to the husbands. See also Katheryn D. Katz, 
The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction, 8 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 
I, 19 n.95 (1997) (citing extreme secrecy regarding donor anonymity as "one of the 
hallmarks of physician control"). Still, many legally unmarried women prefer anonymous 
donors because it guards against the physical and emotional upheaval that could be caused 
by a biological father's threat to custody, privacy, or general well-being. 
12. See ELIZABETH NOBLE, HAVING YOUR BABY BY DoNOR INSEMINATION 90-92 (1987). 
A 1987 survey conducted by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessments reported that 
80,000 women had used donor insemination, leading to roughly 30,000 pregnancies. Vickie 
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women are in making reproductive choices, they find that their autonomy is 
considerably impaired, particularly in comparison to their heterosexual, 
married counterparts who make up the majority of consumers of ART. 
Where married women are free to consent to using methods most likely to 
result in conception, legally unmarried women,13 through a combination of 
excessive physician discretion and lack of legal protections, are frequently 
barred from choosing their preferred options for conception. 
Lesbians and/or single women seeking to procreate are entitled to 
pursue the same reproductive options, with their accompanying risks and 
benefits, that are afforded to heterosexually partnered women. This note 
will critique the paternalistic roles of doctors in permitting or restricting 
heterosexually unpartnered women's access to nontraditional methods of 
reproduction. Secondly, it will explore legally unmarried women's 
constitutional protections as consumers of ART and will suggest legislative 
reform to correct current private discrimination, using California as an 
example of a current misapplication of good law and a model for proposing 
regulatory reform. 
This note argues that lesbians and/or single women are entitled to the 
full range of reproductive technologies that married couples enjoy access 
to. Clearly, the state retains a strong interest in clarifying parentage and 
discouraging litigation and other burdens on the state when children are not 
fully accounted for by legal parents. This note argues that this state interest 
is best served by honoring the preconception intent of each adult who took 
part in conception, regardless of his/her biological role. Part II will identify 
the history and definitions of current reproductive technologies, the roles of 
medical providers in this history, and some ways in which these roles affect 
lesbians and/or single women as consumers of ART. Part III will explore 
the questions of constitutional and state protections for unmarried people 
who wish to conceive noncoitally. Part IV will consider the right to enter 
contracts and its implications regarding reproductive technology and 
establishing parentage. Part V will examine California state law as a 
multifaceted example of good legislation, needed legislation, and 
frustrations of legislative intent by overentitled medical professionals. Part 
VI will elaborate on proposed regulatory schemes, designating who should 
L. Henry, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the Rights and Responsibilities of 
Unmarried Women Who Conceive by Alternative Insemination and a Modelfor Legislative 
Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 285, 288 (1993). About 8,600 of those women were 
unmarried, and of those, around 1,700 reported being lesbians. !d. 
13. "Legally unmarried women" will be used interchangeably with "lesbians and/or 
single women," recognizing that many lesbian couples see themselves as married, even 
when the state has yet to reflect this reality. While the term "single" technically describes 
the legal standing of women who are not in state-sanctioned marriages with men, it does not 
sufficiently match many partnered women's identities and is therefore not preferable here. 
While many of the unmarried women seeking access to ART are indeed unpartnered, many 
are actually in stable, long-term relationships, either with female or male partners. 
Additionally, some consumers of ART are both lesbian and single. 
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control questions of access to reproductive technologies in a realm that is 
simultaneously legal, medical, social, and moral. 
II. DEFINITIONS OF ART AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDICAL 
PROFESSION 
A. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Assisted reproductive technology (ART) refers to a wide range of 
processes designed to enable conception of sperm and egg when coital 
reproduction is either not possible or not desirable. 14 
1. Insemination 
Artificial insemination, also known as alternative fertilization,15 refers 
to the process of inserting sperm into a woman's vagina or uterus. 16 
Frequently, medical professionals and legislatures make a distinction 
between two kinds of insemination: Insemination by a woman's husband 
14. See Daar, supra note 9, at 614. The majority of people using ART today are upper-
middle class, heterosexual married couples who have encountered considerable difficulty in 
conceiving through sexual intercourse. See generally CHRISTO ZOUVES & JULIE SULLIVAN, 
EXPECTING MIRACLES: ON THE PATH TO HOPE FROM INFERTILITY TO PARENTHOOD (1999). 
Many observers have pointed out the significant financial cost of ART and the fact that few 
health insurance plans cover ART. LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC 
CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, 
PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 203 (1998). The expense undoubtedly results in ART being 
available primarily to upper-middle class people who have substantial amounts of 
expendable income. Although not all users of ART are upper-middle class white people, 
they comprise a significant majority of ART users. A substantial minority of women using 
ART are lesbians and/or single women, whose initial use of ART derives from their 
aspiration to reproduce noncoitally with donor sperm. In some cases, however, some of 
these sperm recipients use more advanced technology to address infertility issues on their 
part, on their donor's part, or both. See TOEVS & BRILL, supra note II, at 348-367. 
15. Nomenclature for the process of taking sperm into one's reproductive tract through 
noncoital means continues to change. An advocate from the San Francisco-based group 
Prospective Queer Parents argues that the term "artificial insemination" reveals value 
judgments that should be changed: 
First of all, since the process of wanting to insert sperm into the vagina or 
directly to the uterus without copulating is a perfectly natural process, there 
is no reason to refer to it as "artificial." It is not the most common way of 
getting pregnant, so it is reasonable to refer to it as an "alternative" method. 
Secondly, the word "insemination" derives from the root word meaning 
"semen." This implies that the process of having a baby is focused more on 
the sperm than on the egg, when in fact, both are required and equally 
important. For that reason, the term "fertilization" is a more unbiased and 
accurate term for the process. 
Alternative fertilization is a process used by thousands of people for a 
wide variety of reasons. There is no need to consider it abnormal or focused 
solely on sperm as suggested by the use of artificial insemination. 
Will Doherty, Artificial Insemination or Alternative Fertilization?, at http://www. 
queerparents.orglfertilize.html (last modified May 16, 2002). 
16. See Daniel Wikler & Norma 1. Wik1er, Turkey-baster Babies: The Demedicalization 
of Artificial Insemination, 69 Milbank Q. 5, 8 (1991). 
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(AIR), 17 and insemination by "donor" (DI),18 using the sperm of a man 
who is not the woman recipient's husband. 19 
Furthermore, there are different methods of insemination, and 
depending on the fertility of both the sperm and egg in question, they may 
yield positive pregnancies at different rates.20 The most commonly used 
method is standard vaginal insemination.21 Although women may have 
legal or personal incentives to have doctors perform this form of 
insemination, the process itself is simple and often easily performed outside 
medical settings. 22 Some people who have concerns about compromised 
fertility or are simply eager to use a more efficient method of insemination 
choose to use intrauterine insemination (IUI). In IVI, semen is placed in a 
centrifuge (usually housed in a medical laboratory), where the sperm are 
"washed," extracted from the semen, and inserted directly into a woman's 
uterus via a long, sterile catheter syringe.23 This procedure, although not 
required by law to be performed by a physician,24 requires substantial 
training in that the conditions under which it should be performed are 
highly specific. 25 Although IVI is somewhat more invasive, expensive, and 
medically complex than standard vaginal insemination, the odds of 
conception are considerably higher, particularly where the sperm samples 
in question yield lower than average numbers of motile sperm. 
2. In Vitro Fertilization 
In addition to insemination procedures, more complex technology is 
17. The process of using a recipient's husband's spenn is also called "homologous" 
insemination. WILFREDJ. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 3 (2d. ed. 1976). 
18. The process of using the spenn of anyone not married to the recipient is also called 
"heterologous" insemination. ld. 
19. The primary focus here is on donor insemination for legally unmarried women. For 
many years since its practice began in the late 1800's, insemination was utilized almost 
exclusively by married women. For an interesting discussion of the historical legal and 
moral mandates carried out by physicians to restrict insemt'nation to married women using 
their husband's spelm only, see COREA, supra note 8, at 34-42. 
20. TOEVS & BRILL, supra note II, at 44-45. 
21. This is the most common type of insemination, often thought of as the "turkey-baster 
method," where a woman inserts semen into her vagina to allow spenn to swim into her 
cervix, uterus, and fallopian tubes to meet an ovum for fertilization. See id. at 291. 
22. See id. 
23. lUI is a more fonnal procedure and it is important that it is perfonned correctly. See 
id. at 304-05. It is crucial that the practitioner of lUI knows how to gently guide a sterile 
catheter through the cervix to the uterus, and does so only after spenn has been washed and 
extracted from the semen. Id. 
24. There is very little in the way of regulations regarding methods of vaginal 
insemination. Only the state of Georgia restricts the practice of vaginal insemination to 
physicians, which, in this author's opinion, has little to do with safety and much to do with 
controlling women's reproduction. Georgia law also relieves physicians of responsibility 
for having perfonned insemination only if they receive written authorization from "both the 
husband and the wife," suggesting that Georgia does not intend for single people to use 
insemination in the state whatsoever. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (2001). 
25. See TOEVS & BRILL, supra note II, at 304-05. 
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sometimes available when fertility appears to be significantly 
compromised. This can include in vitro fertilization, where ova are 
"harvested" from a woman's uterus following a detailed daily regimen of 
hormone treatments, fertilized in a petri dish in a medical laboratory, and 
implanted back in her (or another woman's) uterus for gestation.26 
3. Fresh Versus Frozen Sperm and HIV Screening 
All fertility procedures described here feature either "fresh," recently 
ejaculated sperm, or thawed "frozen" or "cryopreserved" sperm. The 
distinction between fresh and frozen sperm samples is important for a 
number of reasons. From a fertility standpoint, fresh semen contains the 
highest concentration of sperm, and its use is more likely to contribute to a 
positive pregnancy result than the use of frozen samples.27 Where a 
particular man's sperm quality or quantity is in question, fresh sperm may 
be the only option for conception through insemination, as the freezing and 
thawing process will render the sample virtually useless. 28 On the other 
hand, the freezing process does not have the same deleterious effect on 
sperm samples with initially high numbers of motile sperm, in that a 
decrease in quantity does not mean that using the sample would be futile. 29 
Furthermore, sperm can be frozen indefinitely,30 allowing for 
comprehensive screening of the donor for any STDs, including HIV.31 
Because HIV antibodies can take up to six months to be detectable by a 
standard HIV test, donors cannot be certain that a negative test result at the 
time of their sperm donation means that they are, in fact, HIV-free.32 By 
freezing the sample then testing the donor six months later, one can 
26. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 8-9. Much of ART, particularly in vitro fertilization and 
related techniques, is prohibitively expensive, and is therefore utilized disproportionately by 
the wealthy. FENWICK, supra note 14, at 203. There are now a number of highly 
sophisticated technologies available, but they are beyond the scope ofthis note. For detailed 
definitions of processes like in vitro fertilization (IV F), gamete intrafallopian transfer 
(GIFT), intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSl), and the implications for surrogate 
gestation, see id. For a discussion of the complex feminist issues raised by this new 
technology, see generally COREA, supra note 8. This kind of technology reflects how 
developments have been largely weighted toward "fixing" prospective gestational mothers 
when fertility is problematic in either sperm donor or recipient. See generally GERMAINE 
GREER, SEX AND DESTfNY: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN FERTILITY (1984). 
27. Brenda Bordson et. aI., Comparison of Fecundability with Fresh and Frozen Semen 
in Therapeutic Donor Insemination, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 466, 468 (1986); D.A. 
Iddendum et aI., A Prospective Randomized Study Comparing Fresh Semen and 
Cryopreserved Semen for Artificial Insemination by Donor, 30 INT. J. FERTILITY 50, 54-56 
(1985); Leslee Subak et aI., Therapeutic Donor Insemination: A Prospective Randomized 
Trial of Fresh Versus Frozen Semen, 166 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1597, 1603 
(1992). 
28. Subak et aI., supra note 27, at 1605. 
29. Id. 
30. NOBLE, supra note 12, at 102. 
31. See id. at 109-10. 
32. Id. 
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conclusively detennine that the donor was HIV negative at the time of the 
emission, eliminating any risk of transmitting HIV to the prospective spenn 
recipient. 33 
There is another way to remove the risk of transmission of sexually 
transmitted diseases like HIV, even where the use of fresh semen may be 
deemed necessary. Sexually transmitted diseases live in semen, but cannot 
be communicated through spenn themselves. 34 In the course of preparing 
spenn for lUI, the washing and spinning process extracts spenn and 
eliminates semen for purposes of insemination. In fact, lUI has been 
repeatedly used by "discordant" couples, where the male is HIV positive 
and the female is HIV negative, to conceive successfully without risking 
exposing the female to HIV.35 
B. USE OF ART BY LESBIANS AND/OR SINGLE WOMEN 
Of the many lesbians and/or single women using ART, untold numbers 
are most likely flying under the radar of state legislatures and physicians: 
They are doing it at home. Because vaginal insemination is simple and 
does not require fonnal training,36 as long as they have access to spenn, 
women may inseminate themselves (with or without assistance) at home.3? 
Lesbians and/or single women also comprise a percentage of women 
who seek to utilize more complex technologies. Some wish to use lUI 
instead of vaginal insemination because of the better odds of conception 
that lUI yields.38 Others seek advanced treatment when their known spenn 
donors have male infertility complications that might be resolved through 
the therapies described above.39 Some women use lUI as part of "washing" 
fresh semen and spenn that was sent in a special "buffer" solution to 
preserve the spenn from known donors who live at a distance from their 
recipients.4o Some lesbians and/or single women, not unlike some of their 
33. ld. 
34. See discussion at supra note 5. 
35. Sim6n Marina et ai., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type-l Serodiscordant Couples 
Can Bear Healthy Children After Undergoing Intrauterine Insemination, 70 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 35, 38-39 (1998). 
36. See NOBLE, supra note 12, at 93. 
37. TOEVS AND BRILL, supra note 11, at 343-45. 
38. RACHEL PEPPER, THE ULTIMATE GUIDE TO PREGNANCY FOR LESBIANS: TIps AND 
TECHNIQUES FROM CONCEPTION TO BIRTH 49-50 (1999). 
39. Although there have been some advances in treating specific manifestations of male 
infertility, the general course of treatment for male infertility is to treat the prospective 
gestational female. For a feminist critique of ART and the ways in which it underscores 
societal exploitation of women "as sex object and child bearers," see generally COREA, 
supra note 8; JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND 
THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1994); Norma Juliet Wikler, Society's Response to 
the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1043 
(1986). 
40. Rainbow Flag Health Services, Overnite Male, at http://www.gayspermbank.com 
lovernite.html (last visited May 1,2003). 
194 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
heterosexually married counterparts, have critical fertility problems due to 
complications of age, physiology, or unknown causes. They may pursue 
therapy in the form of fertility drugs, in vitro fertilization, or other 
advanced treatments. Lastly, some lesbian couples have used in vitro 
fertilization/embryo transfer together, 41 where one partner provided her 
eggs for fertilization, and the other her uterus and body for pregnancy.42 
1. Anonymous Donors 
Some women choose to use the sperm of an anonymous donor, either 
procured through a sperm bank or acquired through a private third party.43 
Typically, the use of an anonymous donor eliminates the possibility of 
either party (the biological mother or the sperm donor) from later emerging 
to assert the sperm donor's paternity.44 
2. Use of Known Donors 
Other women consciously choose known donors - men with whom 
they agree to work toward noncoital reproduction.45 Known donor 
relationships may be based on a wide variety of pre-conception 
understandings.46 Some donors agree to share parenting of future children, 
participating equally and openly with the biological mother.47 Others 
intend to be known to future children as a biological parent, but not to play 
a daily parenting role.48 Some donors wish to inseminate, but agree that the 
sperm recipients will not reveal their donor's identity outside a select 
number of people, if at all.49 In some states, like California, if women and 
their known donors intend that the donors will not be recognized as their 
children's legal or natural parents, the law provides that they may do so by 
having a licensed physician play an intermediary role between the donor 
41. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LESBIANS CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE INSEMINATION AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 36 (Kate 
Kendell ed., 3d ed. 1996). 
42. ZOUVES, & SULLIVAN supra note 14, at 206-16. 
43. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 21. 
44. ld. at 13. For instance, 
ld. 
If the donor knows the mother and child, he may develop more "paternal" 
feelings than he initially anticipated. Consequently, he may want to be 
treated as the child's father. It is not at all uncommon for a donor - who 
originally genuinely thought that he did not want a parental role to begin to 
demand increased contact with the child and to ask for the right to make 
decisions regarding the child's upbringing as she or he gets older. If the 
donor has a change of heart, the donor's knowledge of the mother's identity 
gives him access to seeking custody of or visitation with the child. 
45. ld. at 12. 
46. ld. at 13-15. 
47. Elizabeth Fernandez, Traditional Family, Nontraditional Life: Gay and Lesbian 
Couple Make a Home, S.F. CHRONICLE, August 27, 2000, at AI. . 
48. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 12. 
49. See id. 
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and the recipient. 50 
C. HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS IN ART 
The first U.S. case of documented physician-performed human 
insemination by donor occurred in 1884, to a woman who knew neither that 
her resulting pregnancy was the product of insemination nor that her 
subsequent child was not biologically related to her husband.51 This 
inauspicious event was emblematic of the legacy of physician control over 
women's reproductive choices that continues to manifest today throughout 
the United States.52 
While the degree of control and discretion exerted by physicians has 
loosened somewhat (since the day when physicians were performing donor 
insemination on unsuspecting female patients), it certainly hasn't 
disappeared. Legally unmarried women are seeking to use ART in 
unprecedented numbers, but many find that their range of choices is 
restricted by their physiCians, despite their availability to married women. 53 
In the absence of substantial regulation54 to establish standards for 
evaluating prospective patients of ART, physicians themselves fill in the 
gaps.55 Many physicians and ART facilities have a policy of denying 
insemination or other ART services· to single women, insisting that the 
most legitimate indicator for using ART is a male spouse's infertility.56 
. - -
50. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2001). "The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's 
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." Jd. § 
7613(b). Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming have similar statutes. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 
app. F. . --
51. COREA, supra note 8, at 12 (Describing how a doctor, believing that his patient's 
infertility was due to the poor quality of her husband's sperm, brought her in for an 
"examination," anesthetized her, and inseminated her with the semen of a medical student. 
Although the procedure resulted in a· pregnancy, the patient was never told about the 
insemination, and believed her husband to be the biological father.). 
52. COREA, supra note 8, at 307; Katz, supra note II, at 33; Holly J. Harlow, 
Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial 
Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 178, 194 (1996) 
(referring to the American Fertility Society's overall inclination to "allow physicians to 
make individual moral decisions" for their patients seeking ART). 
53. Henry, supra note 12,.at 288-90. 
54. See Daar supra note 9, at 641-42 (explaining that Congress and the states are 
reluctant to regulate ART for fear of "interfering with procreational choices" as 
"fundamental rights" and suffering the subsequent repeal of such regulation). 
55. Although physicians are private actors not bound by the same constitutional restraints 
as state actors, women still may retain the -right to access ART through public 
accommodations laws. See Harlow, supra note 52, at 204-06 (suggesting that where state 
laws bar owners or agents of any place of public accommodations from withholding 
services on the basis of sex or marital status, and where such laws apply to hospitals and 
clinics, physicians are barred from preventing legally unmarried women from using fertility 
services otherwise offered to married women). 
56. Jd. at 188-94; see also Henry, supra note 12, at 288-89 (citing Office of Technology 
Assessments' survey where ART providers reported that their most common reasons for 
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Ultimately, physicians are allowed to impose their own home-grown 
perceptions of morality on (prospective) patients, thereby overly shaping 
and censuring others' important procreative options. 
Even in states where lawmakers specifically intended to allow for 
single women to be able to use insemination services,s7 physicians and 
ART clinic practitioners may choose whether or not to allow access (or to 
condition it upon certain factors) based on their personal assessment of 
their patient's moral character, including their legal marital status.58 With 
little recourse, prospective patients who are denied reproductive services. on 
moral grounds are powerless to access services that their otherwise 
"morally acceptable" counterparts are free to receive. 
On the other hand, physicians and others cogently argue that placing 
regulatory restraints on physicians' autonomy regarding moral decision-
making could not only misdirect power toward the state,59 but could 
undermine the importance of physicians' individual emphases on medical 
ethics.60 In fact, if political trends significantly informed such regulatory 
restraints, doctors might not only become unwilling agents of the state, but 
could be forced to say or do things which they and others find morally 
repugnant, e.g., being forced by law to refuse specific reproductive services 
to legally unmarried people.61 
rejecting patients were not medically related and included that the prospective parent was 
unmarried, psychologically immature, homosexual, or welfare dependent). 
57. For example, the official annotation to California Family Code section 7613 (a single 
woman's ability to ensure that her sperm donor's paternity is not legally recognized if the 
donor provides his sperm to her physician as intermediary) states: "There is no public 
policy in California prohibiting the artificial insemination of an unmarried woman." CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 7613 (Deering 2002). 
58. See Harlow, supra note 52, at 189-90 (Describing one physician's circular reasoning 
for not allowing single women to use insemination services. Because he believes that a 
single woman who wants a baby through donor insemination must be "emotionally and 
psychologically imbalanced," this physician claims that he has yet to see an unmarried 
patient who was an appropriate candidate for donor insemination.); see also ZOUVES & 
SULLIVAN, supra note 14, at 209. Dr. Zouves, a physician in a well-known ART facility, 
claims to have begun one of the first "ethics advisory boards" in a private clinic. Jd. Here, 
the private facility has its own board, convened specifically to review ethical concerns 
raised by Zouves' assisted reproduction practice. Jd. The existence of this board 
underscores the importance of the complex ethical decisions surrounding the practice of 
ART and physician autonomy. Jd. In this filed, complicated ethical matters are 
contemplated and resolved not by regulatory bodies exercising oversight over the field, but 
rather by individual physicians, operating somewhat like islands. Jd.; see also Katz, supra 
note 11, at 33-34. 
59. See David Orentlicher, The Jnfluence of a Professional Organization on Physician 
Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583,587 (1994). "There is a real danger of overreaching when 
the government establishes guidelines on ethical issues; the government may be easily 
tempted to use its ethics pronouncements to serve other policy goals .... " Jd. 
60. See id. at 586. "If physicians are responsible for establishing their own ethical code, 
they are much more likely to view ethics as an integral part ofthe practice of medicine." Jd. 
61. See infra, Part lII(A), for discussion on the right to reproduce as included in the right 
to privacy. 
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In this case however, physicians are too easily able to make unimpeded 
moral decisions regarding their clientele's methods of assisted 
reproduction, with no assurance that their decisions are based on anything 
other than the physician's whim. Medical providers should concede that 
they are rarely, if ever, in a position to determine a prospective parent's 
future ability to parent competently. A person's marital status doesn't 
guarantee that that person will not contract a sexually transmitted disease, 
let alone make a fit parent, so discrimination between patients of different 
marital status is not only unfair, it's futile. Like California, states should 
legislatively assert that "there is no public policy... prohibiting the 
artificial insemination of an unmarried woman,,,62 and medical providers 
should approach prospective patients in accordance with that policy. 
III. PROCREATIVE RIGHTS OF THE LEGALLY UNMARRIED 
The Supreme Court has yet to speak directly to the question of whether 
there is an affirmative constitutional right to use ART. However, there are 
a number of salient arguments that the Constitution protects citizens' 
reproductive liberties such that they are entitled to pursue reproductive 
technologies. First, there is the rights-based theory of protection which 
posits that people are entitled to broad reproductive liberty as a function of 
their right to privacy.63 Second, there is the perception that the right to 
privacy is not an individual right, but an associational right that protects 
intimate adult, consensual relationships from state intervention until such 
time as material disputes arise.64 Third, it is in the interest of the state and 
its children to honor preconception agreements which may bar donors' 
future paternity rights and to grant parental rights to biologically unrelated 
adults who intend to bear protective responsibility for future children. 
Fourth, although the Constitution doesn't explicitly confer on unmarried 
people the affirmative right to procreate (through ART or otherwise), states 
can and should enact and/or enforce public accommodations laws to bar 
private providers of ART from denying services on the basis of marital 
status or sexual orientation.65 
A. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AS A RIGHT TO REPRODUCE 
While legally married persons clearly have the right to regulate their 
reproduction free from state interference,66 the question here is whether or 
62. CAL. F AM. CODE § 7613 (Deering 2002). 
63. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 22-42; see also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, 
and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 
942,957-67 (1986). 
64. See generally Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive 
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1077 (1998). 
65. Harlow, supra note 52, at 204. 
66. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
198 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
not that right extends to unmarried people. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the 
Supreme Court expanded the right of privacy to include unmarried people's 
reproductive choices in the realm of access to birth control.67 Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, held that, "lithe right to privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting 
a person as the decision whether or not to bear or beget a child.,,68 
Not only has the Court held -that women's right to terminate 
pregnancl9 is "central to the right to privacy,,,70 but it has continued to 
emphasize the significance of individual freedom to make choices in 
matters of reproduction. 71 
Some scholars argue that if the Constitution safeguards the freedom to 
avoid or terminate pregnancy, all protected individuals, _ including 
unmarried women, retain a parallel right to pursue procreation, whether 
through coital or noncoital reproduction. But John A. Robertson, a leading 
legal thinker in the field of'reproductive liberty, explains: "Although the 
Supreme Court has recognized the rights of persons to use birth control and 
terminate pregnancies, this is a right to avoid pregnancy and reproduction. 
It does not necessarily imply a right to engage in coitus in order to get 
pregnant."n Nonetheless, public policy dictates strong reasons for 
protecting unmarried persons' right to reproduce: 
Unmarried persons also have needs or desires to have and r~ar 
biological descendants, and may be ~s competent parents as 
married couples. They may not be able or willing to satisfy this 
desire. . .. Indeed, banning coital or noncoital conception by 
single persons seems absurd when unmarried sexual relations are 
common and when single women cannot be -forced to use 
contraception or to abort after pregnancy has occurred. Surely 
capable rearers should not be denied the opportunity just because 
they are unmarried.73 . - -
The right to procreate, as included in the right to privacy, is neither 
absolute nor yet recognized by -the Supreme Court.74 Certainly, the 
67. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The Court ove-rturned a statute prohibiting the distribution 
of contraceptives to unmarried persons on basis of equal protection. /d. 
68. Id. 
69. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
70. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1992). 
71. Dollens, supra note 7, at 219. 
72. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 38. 
73. Robertson, supra note 63, at 962-63. Practically speaking, "With over 28 percent of 
births in 1990 occurring out of wedlock, it is unrealistic to think that laws prohibiting 
nonmarital sex or penalizing unmarried reproduction would accomplish much." 
ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 38. 
74. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
987,989-95 (2002). 
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recognized right to avoid procreation, as in Eisenstadt, does not conversely 
equal a negative right to seek procreation through any means necessary.75 
Another significant argument is that the state is not compelled to insist that 
private entities accommodate others.76 Additionally, the state may 
intervene on one's reproductive choices if it deems that such choices would 
inflict substantial harm to others.77 Some argue that the universal "harm" 
done to children being raised in single parent and/or lesbian families is 
substantial, but there is significant empirical evidence to refute those 
charges.78 The data are so compelling, in fact, that it is unlikely that the 
state could now justify interference with the right to procreate for lesbians 
and single women on the basis of substantial harm to their children. 
B. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS AND BARRING PRIVATE 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LEGALLY UNMARRIED WOMEN 
CONSUMERS OF ART 
States can enact specific laws to prevent private providers of ART from 
discriminating against prospective patients on the basis of sexual 
orientation or marital status. State public accommodations laws are 
implemented to ban di!;crimination in businesses, facilities, and other 
entities that furnish services and materials to the public.79 For instance, one 
state's statute makes discrimination illegal when it serves "to deny any 
person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public 
accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national 
origin, marital status, sexual orientation, or sex."so However, courts' 
75. See id. at 989-95. Although Sunstein has a strong argument that the right to avoid 
procreation doesn't create a positive right 'to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma indicates 
otherwise. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). There the Supreme Court struck down a state law which 
forced specific felons to be sterilized, asserting that "marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. Sunstein also argues 
that the Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold, 381 U.S. 479'(1965), and Eisenstadt, 405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972), do establish "a presumptive right against government intrusions into 
the decision how and whether to produce children," but are easily distinguishable from cases 
like Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). Sunstein, supra note 74, at 993. Here 
however, the matter is significantly more complicated. The prospective parents' sexual 
conduct may be entirely separate from the matter or manner of procreating. Yet, the 
conduct is nonetheless so potently non-traditional that it may be conflated with an attempt to 
procreate, and the attempt itself may therefore be unprotected. 
76. This argument can be frustrated, however, by the implementation of state public 
accommodations laws. See infra Part IIl(B), 
77. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 37. Such harm could include severe ovetpopulation, but 
the state intervention would need to be designed to decrease compulsion and unwanted 
bodily invasion. Id. 
78. See Harlow, supra note 52, at 196-203 (citing numerous studies that show that 
children of single parent and lesbian families are not disadvantaged by that status); Note, 
Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 MARV. L, REv. 
669,685 n.80 (1985). 
79. Harlow, supra note 52. at 204. 
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03.3 (West 1991 & West Supp. 2003). 
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enforcement of such laws against private providers of ART may be 
contingent upon finding a strong legislative public policy statement that 
intends to protect unmarried women's rights to access ART.8! Where, as in 
California, the legislature also makes it clear that, "There is no public 
policy. .. prohibiting the artificial insemination of an unmarried 
woman,,,S2 plaintiffs alleging discrimination by private ART providers on 
the basis of marital status or sexual orientation should succeed in garnering 
the protection of the state against such discrimination.83 
But California's explicit statement of public policy protecting 
unmarried women's right to use ART isn't necessary to bar such private 
discrimination if a public accommodations law exists.84 The combination 
of protection from a public accommodations law, banning discrimination 
on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation, added to statutory 
protections of all women who seek access to ART, would mean that private 
providers would no longer retain unmitigated discretion in determining 
who could reproduce through their services and who could not.85 
C. ASSOCIA TIONAL RIGHT OF PRlV ACY 
Another privacy right framework that supports access by legally 
unmarried women and their known donors to reproductive technologies is 
the concept of the right to privacy as an associational right. Professor 
Radhika Rao writes that the right of privacy has been mistakenly 
understood as an individual right, where, in fact, it attaches only to entire 
relationships.86 Rao states, "In the context of assisted reproduction, 
81. Harlow, supra note 52, at 207. 
82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 cmt., notes of decisions (West 2001). 
83. Harlow, supra note 52, at 207-15. In Minnesota, a lesbian couple sued a gynecology 
practice for discriminating against them on the basis of sexual orientation by not allowing 
them to use the insemination services otherwise provided to heterosexual single and married 
women. /d. at 208. There, a Minnesota court found that the discrimination would be 
banned under the state's public accommodations law, but for the fact that the Minnesota 
legislature had not otherwise "provide[d] protection for unmarried women seeking artificial 
insemination" in its state parentage act. ld. at 210. In California, however, the exact 
protection called for as statement of public policy exists in Civil Code section 7005, 
applying insemination statutes to all women, not just married women. CAL. CIV. CODE § 
7005(b) (West 2001); CAL. PAM. CODE § 7613, cmt., notes of decisions (West 2001). 
84. Harlow, supra note 52, at 211 (suggesting that the Minnesota case described at supra 
note 83 was decided based on unsound reasoning and that the court should not have looked 
to explicit statements of public policy in a statute for which the issue was not covered). 
85. Another way to provide incentives for providers of ART to refrain from 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status is through professional 
association's guidelines, like the American Medical Association. However, such 
associations are reputed to be far better at setting ethical guidelines than for being able to 
shape their members' ethical practices. See Orentlicher, supra note 59, at 584. 
86. Rao, supra note 64, at 1078, 1088. Although this argument begs questions regarding 
reproductive rights for single women or women who meet opposition from intimate 
partners. Here Rao argues that a woman's right to terminate her own pregnancy, "flows not 
simply from relational privacy, but rather from the woman's own rights to bodily integrity 
and equal protection." ld. at 1109. 
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therefore, the right to privacy shelters procreation, but only when it occurs 
within the confines of a close personal association."s7 Furthermore, while 
adult relationships and the reproductive decisions which spring from them 
are protected from state intrusion by the right to privacy, that shelter ceases 
to exist when the individuals in those relationships become at odds with 
one another.88 Rao suggests that assisted reproduction is not protected 
exclusively through this associational right to privacy, but through a 
confluence of "the rights of privacy, bodily integrity, and equal 
protection."s9 Where two people (such as a known donor and sperm 
recipient) elect to attempt to procreate, whether through sexual intercourse, 
alternative insemination, or laboratory procedures like in vitro fertilization, 
that decision is conduct resulting from a consensual relationship, and is 
therefore protected by the associational right to privacy. Where a woman 
becomes pregnant via insemination with sperm from her known donor, her 
choices regarding her pregnancy are protected through her rights to bodily 
integrity and equal protection, as underscored in seminal cases like Roe v. 
Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Danjorth.90 
In this case, where the question entails the rights of lesbians and/or 
single women to the same level of access to assisted reproduction as 
married couples, the necessary ingredient for protection is the presence of 
this "close personal association." Thus lesbians and/or single women 
should enjoy these rights as well. But this extension of protection has yet 
to be endorsed by the Supreme Court, so, as of yet, lesbians and/or single 
women seeking to have children through assisted reproduction have no 
sanctioned right to do so. 
Clearly, the courts have yet to extend the right of privacy past 
traditional family relationships. Bowers v. Hardwick speaks directly to this 
lack of protection.91 In Bowers, the Court held that deeply held historical 
values could justify withholding judicial protection, and upheld the state's 
right to make and enforce laws against consensual [homosexual] sodomy, 
even where it is conducted within the confines of the home.92 Where 
87. Jd at 1079. 
88. /d. 
89. Id at 1114. 
90. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 482 U.S. 52 (1976) (Court implicitly emphasized 
women's right to bodily integrity by holding that a woman's right to choose abortion could 
not be impeded by her husband's conflicting privacy interest in sustaining her pregnancy); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (weighing the rights of bodily integrity and equal 
protection for pregnant women and fetuses in their comparable rights to privacy); see also 
Rao, supra note 64, at 1107-10. 
91. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
92. Id. at 195-96. Although the Georgia statute in question in Bowers prohibited anal or 
oral sexual conduct altogether, the Court limited its discussion to the law's effect and 
enforcement regarding sexual relations between members of the same sex. Id. at 188, 200-
01. 
The Court is currently revisiting the issues raised in Bowers. Lawrence v. State, 41 
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western society has manifested an historical opposition to homosexual 
sexual behavior, the Court ruled that a state can properly outlaw such 
behavior that would otherwise be constitutionally protected.93 Importantly, 
in Michael H. v.· Gerald D.,94 the Court again affirmed, in a plurality 
opinion, its overwhelming inclination to guard the traditional family 
structure over non-traditional family constellations. There, the Court held 
that the importance of the two-parent, different-sex family overrode a third 
party's biological and relational connection to his biological child where 
the mother was married to a man presumed by state law to be her child's 
father.95 
Supreme Court jurisprudence notwithstanding, donor relationships, 
contracted knowingly between consenting adults who have, by definition, 
formed a "close, personal association" should be protected from state 
intrusion under the associational right to privacy, and free to dictate the 
terms and conditions under which assisted reproduction is to OCCUr.96 If, 
for example, a legally unmarried woman wishes to use fresh sperm for 
insemination (perhaps because her known donor's sperm count is low and 
will not survive freezing), she should be entitled to do so as long as she 
knowingly consents to the attendant risks of using that sperm.97 
Even if this right were to extend to known sperm donors, recipients, 
and even recipients' partners, what would happen after a child is bom if 
subsequent disputes arise between the biological parents? Rao posits that 
even where "the right to privacy extends to use of the technique of artificial 
S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (cert. granted; Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002)). 
Lawrence deals directly with a Texas statute that prohibits "deviate sexual intercourse" 
(defined as "any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or 
anus of another person; or ... the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person 
with an object") between same-sex individuals. Jd. at 350. The Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari, and as of the time this note is going to press, has already heard oral argument. 
The outcome of this case, whether decided on equal protection or substantive due 
process/privacy grounds, may change the discussion herc considerably. It is the author's 
hope that thosc changcs are beneficial to same-sex partners and their families. 
93. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. 
94. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
95. Jd. at 131. 
96. Rao, supra note 64, at 1117-18. Rao cautions, however, that women using known 
donors risk enfolding them in the relationship protected by the right to privacy. Jd. at 1120. 
This would expose such women to weakened protection if their donors later contradict their 
stated preconception intentions and assert themselves as legal parents entitled to associated 
privileges and responsibilities. Jd. But as this Note argues, where women and their known 
donors have demonstrated their unequivoeal preconception intent to shield the known donor 
from lcgal parentage permanently, the state should weigh heavily that intent in deciding to 
preservc the integrity of the women's familics over the donor's biological "investment" in 
the children of those families. 
97. Indeed, the point here is that sperm recipients should be allowed to make informed 
choices, just as legally married recipients may do. Where ART providers will allow the use 
of fresh sperm between spouses (and sometimes heterosexually intimate partners) even 
though the risk of HIV may exist, they deny lesbian sperm recipients the option to make 
those same choices with their known donors. 
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insemination with donor sperm in order to conceive a child, it does not also 
empower one biological parent to bar the other from contact with a child 
born from assisted reproduction .... ,,98 However, many theorists counter 
this argument by stressing individuals' right to contract in the form of 
preconception agreements, where a party may, as a function of 
reproductive liberty, legitimately forfeit any future parental rights and 
responsibilities despite a biological relationship to his/her child.99 Given 
the current judicial adherence to traditional family values, prospective 
parents using donor insemination should emphasize the legitimacy of their 
contractual agreements as a way to gain protection for their nontraditional 
families. 
IV. RIGHTS GROUNDED IN CONTRACT THEORY 
A. STATE ENFORCEMENT OF PRECONCEPTION AGREEMENTS 
The current judicial treatment of preconception contracts and 
arrangements, even where provided for by law, is far from consistent. For 
women using donor insemination, California law provides a method of 
enforcing a preconception agreement to prevent the donor from being 
recognized as the children's natural father. California Family Code section 
7613, subsection (b), states: "The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other 
than the donor's wife is treated in law as ifhe were not the natural father of 
a child thereby conceived."loo 
But, if a woman was unable to use a physician as an intermediary, the 
donor's "paternity rights" can prevail, even if a preconception agreement to 
the contrary was bargained for, drafted, and executed to the fullest extent 
98. Rao, supra note 64, at 1085. 
99. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 125-27; Heruy, supra note 12, at 302-03. One law 
professor states simply: Where children are conceived through insemination or other 
contracted agreement, "intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and 
bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood." Marjorie Shultz, 
Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender 
Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 297, 323. But see Marsha Garrison, Law Makingfor Baby 
Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. 
REv. 835, 860-66 (2000) (arguing that public policy and family law custom restrict the 
ability to enforce contracts based on preconception intentions). 
100. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2001). In practice, this law is not understood to 
require that a physician perform the insemination, but merely that the physician touch the 
semen container before the recipient does. Some medical practices in San Francisco are 
known to provide mere hand-off services, in addition to inseminations, for clients who wish 
to fulfill the statutory requirements described above. Interview with Valerie Curtis Blau, 
M.D., former staff member at UCSF Fertility Clinic in San Francisco, California (Jan. to, 
2002). Currently seven other states have comparable statutes that apply to all women, 
regardless of their marital status. Those states are Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 41, at app. F. 
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possible. In Jhordan C v. Mark K., 101 a single woman used a known donor 
who agreed by contract that he would not assert his paternity should their 
insemination result in a child. lo2 Later, after the birth of the child, the 
donor changed his mind and sued to establish paternity and visitation 
rights. 103 The Court refused to honor the parties' preconception contract 
and recognized paternity, reasoning that the parties had failed to use a 
physician as intermediary as prescribed by statute. I04 
The holding in Jhordan C. naturally leads many sperm recipients and 
known sperm donors to believe that using the physician intermediary, 
where provided for by statute, is the most legally sound method for 
effectively barring the sperm donor from being considered a legal parent. 
In re R.C.,IOS however, was a case where the law in question had identical 
language to California's, but the fact pattern was the converse of Jhordan 
C. There, a single woman had a physician perform both the hand-off and 
the insemination of sperm from a known donor, but had not prepared a 
preconception agreement (which was not required by law).lo6 The donor 
filed suit after the birth of the woman's child, alleging that the woman had 
promised him he would retain parental rights should there be a child. ,o7 
The Court refused to apply the statute and acknowledged the donor's 
paternity, asserting that the statute did not apply to known donor 
situations. lOS 
Clearly, the holdings in Jhordan C and R.C reflect an ongoing 
struggle among the courts to assign parental roles where both biology and 
intent to parent have deviated from the traditional family structure. In each 
case, the courts found a way to acknowledge the paternity of the known 
donor, even though the parties had clearly acted before conception to 
prevent that from happening. It appears that many courts are simply not 
ready to address these nontraditional families on their terms, and are still 
attempting to have them fit older, traditional models of families. As more 
of these cases arise, courts should look more to the intent expressed by the 
parties before (and to some extent, after) conception through contractual 
agreements than to whether or not the families can be forcibly reshaped to 
adhere to traditional, two-parent, heterosexual models. 
B. MEETING THE STATE INTEREST IN CLARIFYING PARENTAGE BY 
LOOKING TO INTENT TO PARENT 
It is well established that the state retains a strong interest in ensuring 
101. Jhordan C. v. Mark K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). 
102. Id. at 532. 
103. ld. at 533. 
104. Id. at 535. 
105. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en bane). 
106. Id. at 28. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 35. 
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that children are accounted for by legal parents. I09 Although courts do not 
consistently weigh intent to parent as heavily as they should, they would do 
well to apply traditional notions of contract theory in detennining who 
bears parental rights and responsibilities for planned children. 
Historically, parentage was generally established through biological 
relationship. As reproductive technology and family structures continue to 
evolve, however, the use of biology as a tool for clarifying parentage is 
decreasingly instructive. Recent surrogacy cases are clearly analogous to 
the consideration of parenthood based on procreative intention, but courts 
have yet to broadly apply standards announced in that context to 
ratification of preconception intent. 
In Johnson v. Calvert, a husband and wife contracted with a surrogate 
to carry their embryo.IIO Relations between the surrogate and the couple 
soured, and all vied for a detennination that they were the child's legal 
parents. III The California Supreme Court affinned that the couple were the 
child's natural parents, and upheld the surrogacy contract against the 
surrogate's claims.ll2 There, the court asserted that although both genetic 
consanguinity and gestation are means of establishing a "parent-child 
relationship," if those roles are divided between two people, the one who 
intended to bring about the birth of the child and raise it as her own is the 
natural mother. I 13 
In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, a married couple entered into a 
surrogacy contract with a woman that specified that none of the parties 
were to contribute ovum or spenn, but the embryo would be donated. I 14 
While the surrogate carried the non-genetically related fetus, the couple's 
marriage faltered. 115 Upon seeking a divorce, the husband disclaimed any 
parental responsibility to the child. 116 The wife asserted that both she and 
her estranged husband were the legal parents. 1l7 The surrogate/gestational 
mother, per the contract, stipulated that she was not biologically related to 
the child. 118 Relying on archaic notions that biology detennines 
parenthood, the trial court found that the child, whose spenn and egg 
donors were presumably pennanently anonymous, had no lawful parents 
109. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 296 (2000) (citing motivation 
behind UPA to achieve legal rights for children born outside of traditional, married 
relationships); cf Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 77 (Cal. 1998) (deriving legislative 
emphasis on the need for child support obligations). 
110. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
Ill. /d. at 778. 
112. /d. at 787. 
113. /d. at 785. 
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whatsoever. 119 Entirely dissatisfied with that result, the Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that, were it not for the intent and agreement of the 
married couple to become parents, the child would not exist. 120 The court 
held that California Family Code section 7613 should be applied to a wife 
and non-biological mother in the same way it applies to a non-biological 
father and husband, and acknowledged that the sarne logic might be 
extended to apply to a legally unmarried couple.12I Reflecting the courts' 
consistent concern that children have a "natural," i.e. legal, mother and 
father, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that both of the Buzzancas 
Gust like the husband whose wife conceives through donor insemination 
under California Family Code section 7613) are the lawful parents based on 
their exclusive intent to bring the child into the world as their own. 122 
However, while the court pointed to a number of cases related to lesbian 
parents, it refused to speculate as to the impact that its holding in Buzzanca 
would have on them. 123 The Buzzanca court explicitly distinguished such 
cases from the case at bar on the grounds that Buzzanca only grappled with 
legally married couples. 124 
For same-sex parents, traditional notions of family still limit the extent 
of judicial support their families receive. Widespread societal preference 
for two-parent, two-gender families 125 appears to limit courts' willingness 
to uphold donor and parenting agreements where no father would otherwise 
exist. 126 As in the cases of lhordan C. and In re R.C., California and 
Colorado courts acknowledged legal paternity of known donors even 
though the donors and recipients had specifically contracted to permanently 
release the donors from all privileges and responsibilities of fatherhood. 
Again, where the donor had even a marginal or casual relationship to the 
children, the courts overwhelmingly preferred to extend that relationship 
119. !d. at 289. 
120. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998). 
121. Jd.at286. 
122. Jd. 
123. Ed. at 287. 
124. Jd. 
125. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821,824 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. ReI. 1977). "The courts have 
consistently shown a policy favoring the requirement that a child be provided with a father 
as well as a mother." Jd. 
126. NATlONALCENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 6. 
!d. 
The courts have consistently shown a policy favoring the requirement that a 
child be provided with a father. When there is no husband to assume that 
role, some judges have been known to place a burden beyond the 
requirements of the statute on single women to demonstrate that the donor 
did not intend to be the father of the child (such as a written agreement by 
the donor to relinquish his parental rights), otherwise the donor may be 
considered a natural father entitled to visitation with respect to an 
"illegitimate" child. 
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with legal parentage. 127 
In some jurisdictions of California, however, courts are recogmzmg 
couples consisting of biological and non-biological prospective parents 
who sought to conceive through donor insemination as legal parents under 
California Family Code section 7613. Although this recognition has yet to 
be thoroughly tested in the courts, its mere existence underscores the 
courts' increasing and appropriate emphasis on assigning parentage based 
on intent, regardless of the gender of the parents. This is a hopeful 
direction, and one that other jurisdictions would do well to follow. 
Ultimately, if courts express a preference for two-parent homes (not just 
families), this preference is best met by acknowledging legal parents based 
on their preconception intent rather than on their biological relationship (or 
127. Until 2001, many courts in California, upon the specific recommendation of the 
California Department of Social Services, authorized "modified" independent adoptions, 
allowing same-sex partners of biological parents to attain legal parentage status of their 
partners' children. Until recently, many California eourts allowed these adoptions under 
California Family Code seetions 8617 and 8819, whieh allow biological parents to 
independently relinquish and assign parental rights directly to adoptive parents. See CAL. 
FAM. CODE §§ 8617,8819 (West 2002). The Department of Social Services had devised a 
form which amended the independent adoption process by clarifying that, in situations like 
the instant case, the biological parent was not so much relinquishing her own parental rights 
as assigning parental rights to a second, adoptive parent. 
However, In Sharon S. v. Superior Court, this adoptive process was thwarted, pending 
imminent review by the California Supreme Court. 113 CaL Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(review granted and opinion superseded by Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 39 P.3d 512 
(2002». Sharon S. and Annette F. were longtime partners and legal parents to Sharon's 
biological child. Jd. at 110. Annette and Sharon together planned and participated in every 
stage of the insemination process, and after the child was born, Annette adopted the child 
through the second parent adoption process described above. Id. A few years later, the 
couple planned for Sharon's second pregnancy. Id. Sharon gave birth to the second child, 
and the couple began the process to petition for a second parent adoption for Annette. Id. 
Unfortunately, the relationship between the two women faltered, and Sharon sought to bar 
Annette's pending adoption of the second child, asserting that none of the California 
adoption statutes permitted second parent adoptions. Jd. at 111-12. 
The Court of Appeal rejected modified independent adoptions for second parents, 
holding that California law does not provide for such adoptions. Id at 115. Although the 
Department of Social Services asserted that it was merely considering adoption cases on a 
"case-by-case basis," without using marital status as a determining factor, the court rejected 
that rationale, finding that there was no legislative intent to allow second parent adoptions. 
Id. at 112-15. As noted, the California Supreme Court has granted review of Sharon S. 
Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 39 P.3d 512 (2002). In the interim, the California legislature 
enacted Assembly Bill 25 (2002), explicitly granting state-registered domestic partners the 
ability to adopt their partners' biological children through stepparent adoption under 
California Family Code section 9000. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2002». 
In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, discussed supra, the court was willing to extend the 
logic of California Family Code section 7613 to include non-biological mothers to keep 
parentage consistent with preconception intent, but that case involved maintaining parentage 
so that the child there had a legal mother and father. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 CaL 
Rptr. 2d 280, 286-87 (Ct. App. 1998). In Sharon S., however, the court was far less 
concerned with maintaining parentage so that the child had its two intended parents, given 
that those parents were the same-sex, and hence legally unmarried. Sharon s., 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 113-15. 
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lack thereof) to their children. 
C. PHYSICIAN CONTROL AND THE CATCH-22 128 
Even if the statutory language in California and Colorado does apply to 
known donor situations, it still may present a substantial problem for 
legally unmarried women. Where the statute compels legally unmarried 
women to use a physician as an intermediary to protect the donor from 
paternal rights and responsibilities, physicians themselves frequently refuse 
to provide their services on the basis of marital status and/or sexual 
orientation. I 29 
V. CALIFORNIA REGULATION OF ACCESS TO ART AND 
THE EXAMPLE OF FRESH VERSUS FROZEN SPERM 
Users of basic reproductive technologies like vaginal and intrauterine 
insemination, married or not, should be equally entitled to consent to such 
procedures. An illuminating example is the issue of fresh and frozen 
sperm, how its use is treated by the law, and how its use is controlled by 
physicians and other ART providers. 
A. FRESH SPERM FOR ALL KNOWN DONORS 
Where male fertility is compromised, the difference in rates of 
conception between fresh and frozen sperm is considerable since frozen 
semen samples with low sperm counts may yield few to no sperm upon 
thawing. In many cases, women looking to conceive with men whose 
semen samples reflect low sperm counts may learn that their best odds of 
conceiving through insemination are through intrauterine insemination 
using fresh sperm. 130 Physicians will not only perform inseminations on 
married women using their husband's fresh sperm; they often insist on it 
for the increased odds of pregnancy that fresh sperm yields. Most, 
however, refuse to perform the procedure for legally unmarried recipients 
with their known donors' sperm. 131 
In some known donor relationships, recipients' selection of their 
donors is a long, thoughtful process, many years in the making. There are a 
myriad of factors evaluated in choosing a donor. Recipients may choose a 
known donor because there is a close relationship between the parties, there 
is an increased possibility of using the same donor for future children, or 
even for genetic reasons. 132 Regardless as to their reasons for selecting a 
128. Harlow, supra note 52, at 214. 
129. See id. 
130. TOEVS & BRILL, supra note 11, at 345. 
131. Infonnal poll, conducted by author, of fifteen ART clinics in California (Feb. 5-12, 
2002) (on file with author). 
132. Henry, supra note 12, at 301 (noting that an unmarried woman might choose a known 
donor to have access to their medical background, to establish a biological relationship 
between siblings born to the recipients, or to resolve any mystery that children would 
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particular donor, these recipients are as entitled to select the donor of their 
choice as are women who "choose" their husbands. 
Although the use of fresh sperm involves some risk that HIV could be 
communicated,133 this is a risk that millions of informed Americans are 
entitled to take whether they reproduce coitally or noncoitally with fresh 
semen. When a donor is found to have a low sperm count, recipients and 
donors should be as entitled as married couples to pursue IUI, and 
California law explicitly allows for their use of fresh sperm. 
California Health and Safety Code section 1644.5 provides that all 
tissue transfers shall be done only if the donor has been screened and found 
negative for evidence of infection with HIV, hepatitis, and syphilis. 134 For 
sperm donors, however, section 1644.5, subsection (c), provides a relevant 
exception: 
(1) A recipient of sperm, from a sperm donor known to the 
recipient, may waive a second or other repeat testing of that 
donor if the recipient is informed of the requirements for 
testing donors under this section and signs a written waiver. 
(2) A recipient of sperm may consent to therapeutic insemination 
of sperm or use of sperm in other advanced reproductive 
technologies even if the sperm donor is found reactive for 
hepatitis B, hepatitis C, or syphilis if the sperm donor is the 
spouse of, partner of, or designated donor for that recipient. 135 
This law clearly establishes that it is the prerogative of the recipient, 
whether or not she is otherwise sexually involved with her known donor, to 
waive a retest of the donor once he has been tested for HIV and other 
diseases. 136 Nonetheless, many physicians and ART facilities refuse to 
otherwise incur if their sperm donor were forever unknown to them). 
133. See NOBLE, supra note 12, at 102-03. 
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.5 (West 2001). Subdivision (a) of that code 
section provides: 
No tissue shall be transferred into the body of another person by means of 
transplantation, unless the donor of the tissues has been screened and found 
nonreactive by laboratory tests for evidence of infection with HIV, agents of 
viral hepatitis (HBV and HCV) human T lymphotrophic virus-I (HTL V -I), 
and syphilis. The State Department of Health may adopt regulations 
requiring additional screening test of donors or tissues when in the opinion 
of the State Department, the action is necessary for the protection of the 
public, donors, or recipients. 
Jd. § 1 644.5(a). 
135. Jd. § 1 644.5(c) (emphasis added). 
136. The California Legislature had every intention of making this law applicable to 
women who were working with known donors. Had the goal been to restrict it to spouses 
and sexually intimate partners, it would have used only the terms "spouse" and "partner." 
"Designated donor" can only mean "known donor" as it is used here. 
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allow recipients access to technologies to which they are entitled by law. 137 
B. PHYSICIANS' DISCREPANT UNDERSTANDING OF LAW 
Assisted reproductive technology (ART) is currently progressing far 
faster than the law. As a result, a good deal of ART is unregulated. While 
there are few laws or medical guidelines which dictate the conditions under 
which ART may be performed, physicians and tissue banks, following 
either accreditation standards or privately generated guidelines, often 
believe that they are acting in accordance with laws which do not exist. 
When several ART providers in California were asked if they would 
provide any services (insemination, in vitro fertilization, or otherwise) for a 
recipient using her known donor's fresh sperm, the majority said that they 
could only use fresh sperm when the recipient and donor were married. 138 
Each provider grounded this policy in their expressed (however mistaken) 
belief that California law prohibited the use of fresh sperm between donors 
and recipients who were not otherwise "sexually intimate." Although the 
law specifically uses the language, "or designated donor," many physicians 
and other ART providers seem to be under the impression that they cannot 
allow recipients of known donors' sperm to waive a retest. This may have 
something to do with the suggested guidelines put forth by the American 
Association of Tissue Banks (AA TB), a scientific, nonprofit peer group 
organization. The organization suggests that all known donor sperm be 
screened and frozen for at least six months, in the same ways that 
anonymous sperm should be treated, and that sperm of recipients' intimate 
partners need not be screened in such a fashion (if at all).139 
This is not to say that there are not legitimate concerns associated with 
137. In a troubling recent development, a new Food and Drug Administration regulation 
may codify this practice into law. See Suitability Determination for Human Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,626 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 210, 211, 820, 1271). A proposed rule would require that all known donors' semen 
would be necessarily frozen and quarantined for six months, effectively disallowing the use 
of fresh sperm from known donors who are not the sexual partners of the recipients, even 
where sperm are not viable after freezing. Jd. at 52,706 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
1271.80(d)). Furthermore, the proposed rule goes much further: It proposes to ban 
donations from anyone identified as having a risk factor or clinical evidence of 
communicable disease. Jd. at 52,722 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271.75(c)). Both 
aspects of this proposed rule have been subject to considerable criticism, but the public 
comment period for the rule closed on December 29, 1999. Jd. at 52,626. The formal rule 
has yet to be issued. 
138. Informal poll, conducted by author. Among twenty-eight California ART providers 
queried, two ART providers said that it was their policy (mistakenly), under law, to confine 
the use of fresh sperm to donors and recipients who were otherwise sexually intimate 
partners, not necessarily legally married. Jd.; see also Interview with Dr. Victor Fujimoto, 
UCSF Fertility Clinic, San Francisco, California (July 30, 2001); Telephone interview with 
Sharon Mills, Director, Pacific Reproductive Services, San Francisco, California (Feb. 4, 
2002). 
139. See generally, American Association of Tissue Banks, Reproductive Tissue, at 
http://www.aatb.org (last visited May 1,2003). 
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the use of fresh sperm. Again, using fresh sperm means that donors cannot 
be tested for the presence of HI V at the time of the sperm donation (since a 
test performed at that time can only show conclusively that the donor was 
HIV negative six months prior to the test). This presents some risk that the 
recipient (and even a resulting fetus, if it develops) could contract HIV, but 
this risk exists for all sperm recipients. When a known donor agrees and 
contracts with the intended recipient to refrain from risk behavior for 
sexually transmitted diseases upon being screened for the presence of HIV 
and other sexually transmitted diseases, it is up to the recipient to determine 
whether she is willing to trust that particular donor based on her 
understanding of his trustworthiness. Similarly, this is the case with other 
married and otherwise sexually intimate donors and recipients. A woman 
who is using her sexual partner's sperm to reproduce, whether coitally or 
not, must make an independent determination as to whether she trusts her 
partner to have refrained from any behavior that could have subjected him 
to HIV transmission since his last test (and the six months prior to that). If 
sexually intimate partners are able to make the determination to use fresh 
sperm for procreative purposes, recipients of known donors' sperm should 
be entitled to make that same determination. 140 Furthermore, where either 
donor or recipient has concerns' that the use of fresh sperm could transmit 
HIV, shefhe should be able to choose to have the sperm "washed" in order 
to significantly reduce the risk of transmission. 141 
VI. PROPOSED REGULATION TO PROTECT UNMARRIED 
WOMEN'S ACCESS TO ART 
Despite the size of the ART industry, there is a striking paucity of 
regulation controlling it. 142 Among a large. number of unregulated areas, 
there are two areas that merit more attention and regulation in regard to 
legally unmarried women's access to ART: i) supervision of the 
relationship between providers and consumers; and 2) clarification of the 
responsibilities and rights of legally unmarried women and their donors. 143 
A. REGULATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVIDERS AND 
CONSUMERS 
As argued above, ART providers exercise far too much discretion in 
140. This is true in every state except Illinois, which requires that "all donors of semen for 
purposes of artificial insemination be tested for evidence of exposure to human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other identified causative agent of acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) prior to the semen being made available for that use." 
20 ILL. COMPo STAT. 2310/2310-325 (2001). This means that all sperm from all sperm 
donors, married or not, must be frozen so that the donor can be retested for HIV before the 
sperm is released. 
141. Marina et aI., supra note 35, at 35-39. 
142. Daar, supra note 9, at 639. 
143. Id. at 637. 
212 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
detennining "appropriate" patients. Regulation of ART practitioners, in 
setting standards for licensure of ART physicians and support staff, could 
make licensure contingent upon practitioners' refraining from 
discriminating against prospective patients on the basis of marital status 
and/or sexual orientation. As in California, states can require that 
practitioners obtain written infonned consent before perfonning services, 144 
especially where there is any risk of significant bodily hann, including the 
communication of sexually transmitted disease. 
D. CLARIFICA nON OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF LEG ALL Y 
UNMARRIED WOMEN AND THEIR KNOWN DONORS 
Although the focus here is on equalizing access to various fonns of 
ART, the future for women and their children conceived through ART is an 
important element of initial access. It is critical that states enable women 
and their donors to make binding preconception agreements. Legally 
unmarried women should be pennitted to use known donors without 
running the risk of paternity suits. 145 States should, at minimum, pass 
legislation similar to California's to enable elimination of future paternity if 
spenn samples pass through licensed physicians or other specified 
professionals. 146 
This strategy soundly rejects the rationale behind the famous case of In 
re Baby M, where the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted that the natural 
rights of biological parents cannot and should not be bargained away. 147 In 
Baby M, the court held that surrogacy contracts were void for public policy 
reasons in that neither children nor rights to parentage should be bought or 
sold. 148 
The California case of Johnson v. Calvert provides a more apt model 
than Baby M. for evaluating the rights of lesbian and single women in 
fonning their families. 149 Whereas Baby M. prohibits parties from 
contracting away their natural parentage, Johnson v. Calvert is far more 
144. Id at 639. 
145. Henry,supra note 12, at 301. 
146. Although it is not preferable to continue to put physicians at the center of otherwise 
non-medical processes (like standard vaginal inseminations), this would occur with the 
understanding that physicians could no longer discriminate based on marital status and 
sexual orientation, and that many ART processes should require a physician. Some 
advocates of unmarried women's access to ART maintain that it is still better to place 
physicians at the center of the insemination dynamic to ensure that proper medical screening 
of the donor and recipient can occur. See Note, supra note 78, at 685 n.16. 
147. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
148. !d. at 1240. 
149. johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). In Johnson, the court held that 
surrogacy contracts do not sell a "mother's" rights, but are agreements to "provide a 
necessary and profoundly important service without (by definition) any expectation that she 
will raise the resulting child as her own." !d. at 787. Furthermore, any payments in relation 
to such contracts are made for the service of gestation, not for the purchase of parental 
rights. Id at 784. 
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engaged with current realities, recognizing that the state itself benefits from 
acknowledging that intended, responsible parents and biological or 
gestational parents are not always, and should not always be, one and the 
same. It is far better for the state to encourage parties to establish 
parentage before the birth of a child, thereby preventing the many costs and 
risks of messy litigation to both the child and the state. There is also 
another factor to the strategies advocated here that is distinguishable from 
Baby M There, the court was particularly concerned with the notion of 
placing parentage rights on the open market. Here, however, there is no 
suggestion that donor and preconception contracts are commercial in nature 
- parentage rights are not for sale. They are to be assigned without 
payment, legally and permanently. 
States should follow burgeoning judicial practices by allowing written 
preconception agreements, notarized or ratified by the courts (through, for 
example, family law magistrates) to designate future parental roles as 
binding unless all contracting parties agree later to modify their agreement. 
This way, parties could avoid the intrusion, expense, and interference that 
one or more required visits to a physician might impose. 150 It would also 
include "the involvement of an objective third party [who] 'can serve to 
create a formal, documented structure for the donor-recipient relationship, 
without which. .. misunderstandings between the parties regarding the 
nature of their relationship and the donor's relationship to the child will be 
more likely to occur. ",151 Most importantly, it would provide the stability 
and parental responsibility that is in the best interest of both the child and 
the state. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Lesbians and/or single women are legitimate consumers of ART, but 
have been restricted by physician discretion and bias. Because ART and 
access to ART remains largely unregulated, and because there are so few 
professional guidelines or standards in this arena, many physicians feel free 
to exercise personal judgment in determining who should have access to 
reproductive technologies and to what extent that access should be granted. 
It is unrealistic, in this era of accepted and abundant single parenting, 
for states to refuse to protect legally unmarried people's ability to procreate 
in the manner they see fit. As California has done, states need to pass 
explicit legislation that makes legally unmarried people's access to ART a 
matter of public policy. Following California's model, legislatures should 
ensure that there are concrete ways for sperm recipients and their donors to 
effectively bar future acknowledgment of paternity. States can pass 
ISO. Henry, supra note 12, at 301. 
151. Daar, supra note 9, at 30 I (quoting arguments of defendant mother in Jhordan C. v. 
Mark K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
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legislation t6 enforce written preconception agreements and designate legal 
parentage based on those agreements, not on biology. 
By passing and enforcing public accommodations laws, states will 
endow lesbians and/or single women with a legal remedy for the damage 
they incur when their reproductive autonomy is impeded by physician bias. 
When ART providers mistakenly (or willfully) invoke nonexistent law to 
enforce discriminatory policies, patients who have been refused services 
should have authority to resist those policies. 
